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BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The panel was convened at 12:30 P.M., Thursday, March 14, by its co-chairs, Allyn L.
Taylor and Frederick Abbott, of Florida State University College of Law. Allyn Taylor
introduced the panelists: George P. Smith, Catholic University School of Law, and
Jensine Andresen, Boston University.
OPENING REMARKS BY ALLYN L. TAYLOR*
The globalization of public health has been described as posing new threats and
important opportunities for international health.' Perhaps nowhere else is this phe-
nomenon more evident than in the realm of biotechnology.
Research into the genetic basis of life is creating a plethora of new possibilities to
diagnose, treat, and prevent illness. Advances in biotechnology promise to revolutionize
medicine in identifying and treating illnesses that exact an enormous toll on people
throughout the world. Although few promising interventions currently exist, the poten-
tial global public health implications of the promised treatments and cures based on
genetics technologies are profound. Tools and treatments generated by genetics research
may have an extraordinary effect on diseases and illnesses that afflict industrialized
nations, as well as those that are the curse of developing states. Genetics technologies
may affect the health of billions to the extent that they become affordable and acces-
sible worldwide.
Potential applications of genetic science, such as germ-line therapy and human
reproductive cloning, raise controversial global issues about the manipulation of the
human species, in particular how to promote the biosocial potential of humans in a
manner consonant with the integrity of the individual and the entire species. Even
though they raise no new issues in medicine, human rights, or public health, many of
the potential applications of genetic science exacerbate old issues, especially those
related to equity, privacy, disclosure of genetic information, and freedom of reproduc-
tive choices and of scientific inquiry.
The distinguished scholars on this panel will consider critical issues of resource allo-
cation and human rights. The potential inequity in the global distribution of health
care interventions generated by biotechnology may well widen the gaps in health
standards that already exist between and within rich and poor states. To what extent is
intellectual property law consistent with the human right to health in this era of genetic
advances? What types of collective action and partnerships can advance universal access
to the benefits of genetic science? Can the codification of international law contribute
to ensuring that the results of scientific inquiry are made available to individuals in both
rich and poor states and that advances in biotechnology fulfill their promise of
improving the health of billions?
* Health PolicyAdviser, World Health Organization; Adjunct Faculty, University of Maryland School of Law
andJohns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, Baltimore, MD.
'DerekYach & Douglas Bettcher, The Globalization of PublicHealth I: Threats and Opportunities, 88 AM.J. PUB.
HEALTH 735 (1998).
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RE-EVALUATING THE FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY THROUGH
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
by George P. Smith, II*
From 1633 and Pope Urban VIII's censure of Galileo for averring Copernicanism' to
July 31, 2001, when the U.S. House of Representatives voted, on bipartisan lines, to ban
human cloning for reproduction as well as for therapeutic medical research purposes,2
the quest to validate the freedom of scientific inquiry is both seen and questioned.
While the mandate for progress has been unclear, one conclusion is inescapable: The
freedom of scientific freedom, shaped by a spirit of social responsibility, must be en-
sured, and indeed promoted, if biotechnology is to be utilized fully in the development
of human rights.3
Much as with structuring a regime for the law of the seas in the 1970s, 4 now-in
matters of biotechnology-and more especially the Convention on Biological Diversity
adopted on May 22, 1992 5-the split is predictable between developed and less-devel-
oped countries over the use of products derived from plant genetic resources.6 In devel-
oping countries, products derived from plant genetic resources become major sources
of potential wealth. Indeed, with the phenomenal growth of knowledge-based industries,
the intellectual property regime assumes a greater vitality in assuring the development
of human rights in developing countries.
7
The challenge is to find a balance between conservation and the reasonable exploita-
tion of national resources. With the proper balance in place, opportunities for eco-
nomic development become a base on which to engraft human rights to growth and
sustainability and to human development. Regrettably, the present international regime
and the amendments proffered to it are defective in accommodating both innovation
and conservation.'
One intriguing proposal for meeting the international problems associated with
biotechnology is the establishment, by treaty, of an international biotechnology patent
office, to which would be referred all end-products derived from plant genetic re-
sources. Such a system would not only advance conservation and preserve biodiversity,
at the same time it would foster a spirit of innovation leading to new end-products.9
The globalization of international relations has given rise to complex issues in geo-
politics-with no problem more central than that of conferring equal status on all human
rights. To achieve this equality, economic and social rights must be factored into efforts
to define and then recognize a rapprochement, indeed an interdependency between,
development and human rights policy. In other words, recognition and use of a human
rights approach to development elevates economic, social, and cultural rights to a co-
equal ranking with political and civil rights.'0
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC.
'See GEORGE P. SMITH, If, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOMEDICINE 20-24 (2000).
2H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001).
' See generally, GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989).
4 SeeGEORGE P. SMITH, I, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF FREE SEAS: MODERN MARITIME LAW RE-EVALUATED
(1980).
' Convention on Biological Diversity,June 5, 1992, 31 ILM 822 (1992).
6 SeDavidJ. Schnier, (, eneticallyModified Organisms and the Caitagena Protoco4 12 FORDHAM ENvL. L.J. 377 (2001).
7 Chetan Gulati, The Tragedy of the Commons in Plant Genetic Resources: The Need fora New International Regime
Centered Around an International Biotechnology Patent Office, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 63 (2001).
Id. at 84.
9Id. at63.
'0 Brigitte I. Hamm, A Human Rights Approach to Development, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1005 (2001).
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It has been suggested that lawyers and scientists have a shared "moral authority" in
defending life and justice and, further, that both professional groups have "special
obligations to humanity.""' Ideally, both should work together for social and distributive
justice-seeking to promote adequate health care, for example, for all members of
society.12
Medical science and biotechnology should seek, through the spirit of scientific in-
quiry, to achieve global implementation of the health-related provisions of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with a special concern for health
care ethics, patient rights, medical research, and human experimentation. 3
Efforts to abridge or destroy the most basic of all human rights-the right to be dif-
ferent-must be restrained by international and national structures, such as a proposed
international biotechnology patent office and enhanced policy-making bodies, such as
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World
Health Organization (WHO), and the president's Bioethics Advisory Counsel, as well
as the National Academy of Sciences. A new ethic of deliberative democracy must be
nurtured-one that sets and then translates standards of normative conduct for the new
Age of Biotechnology that are practical, reasonable, humane, and understandable to
the world community.'
REMARKS BYJENSINE ANDRESEN*
We welcome the intervention of people with resources who can develop a vaccine
for HIV. But we must make certain that that guidelines are in place to ensure that
AIDS vaccines will be affordable by the poorest of the poor.'
-Nelson Mandela
The staggering statistics on the AIDS pandemic help put into perspective the deep
and profound humanitarian significance of this issue and the critical need for a vaccine.
However, many obstacles stand in the way of the development of an AIDS vaccine;
intellectual property considerations, for example, have considerable impact on the
vaccine development scenario. Some proposed solutions to the impasse include tiered
pricing, licensing agreements, purchase commitments, and vaccine development part-
nerships.
Over forty million people worldwide are infected with HIV, the precursor to AIDS,
and more than fourteen thousand new infections are estimated to occur each day. In
sixteen African countries, between 10 and 20 percent of the adult population has HIV.
AIDS now kills more people than any other infectious disease, and it has orphaned
more than thirteen million children worldwide. 2 In fact, some people believe the
number of AIDS orphans will reach forty million in the next decade-a number that
represents, simply, the darkest face of the world's humanitarian failure.
GEORGEJ. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET 257 (1998).
12 Id.
13 Id.
"4 Id. at 257. See also George P. Smith, II, Setting Limits: Medical Technology and the Law, 23 SYDNEY L. REV.
283 (2001); George P. Smith, II,JudicialDecisionmaking in the Age ofBiotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 93 (1999).
Assistant Professor of Theology, Boston University.
'See IAVI Web site, at <http://www.iavi.org/globalmobilzeconomics.hmnl>.
2Statistics provided by the International AIDSVaccine Initiative (IAVI), available at<http://www.iavi.org>
(internal link: need for aVACCINE/the world needs an aids vaccine) [hereinafter IAVI, Need for a vaccine].
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The AIDS crisis also exerts a significant economic drain on the world's economy, both
in wealthy countries, where healthcare costs were increased, for example, by an esti-
mated $7 billion in the United States in 1996,' and in developing countries, where the
drain on sub-Saharan GNP is estimated at 11.7 percent for 1999 alone.4 The United
Nations estimates that AIDS-related costs have reversed social and economic develop-
ment in twenty countries already.5
Given these grim statistics, it is no wonder that more people have begun to place their
hopes in a vaccine.6 Nevertheless, there are many obstacles to the AIDS vaccine. First,
a rather macabre reality is that private companies that produce drugs to treat AIDS
accrue significantly greater amounts of money than would those who might offer a
preventive vaccine. The annual global market for vaccines is estimated at $4 billion,
whereas the global drug treatment market is one hundred times this size ($400 billion).
Second, the costs associated with developing a vaccine are high, estimated at $250-$500
million, while the payoff may be low relative to more profitable drugs.7 These discrep-
ancies are further compounded by the fact that "those countries with the greatest
potential demand for a vaccine have the least ability to pay".'
Dr. Seth Berkley, the president of the International AIDS Vaccine Institute, speaks
out strongly against "[t] he current paradigm" for vaccine development, wherein com-
panies develop and sell vaccines, often exclusively and at very high prices, in order to
recover their research and development costs. As he argues, "Developing countries
should not be forced to wait 10 to 15 years for an AIDS vaccine to trickle down to them."9
Still, it would be naive to attempt to develop an AIDS vaccine without the large-scale
manufacturing facilities and quality control procedures of private industry.0
Thus far, comparatively little money has been directed towards AIDS vaccine deve-
lopment: In 2001, the combined public and private total was $430-$470 million, less
than 1 percent of global health research and development spending. Furthermore, less
than one-third of this sum actually went toward producing vaccine candidates; the rest
went into basic and applied research or trials infrastructure."
According to the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (LAVI), intellectual property
can be defined most broadly as:
intangible property based on creations of the mind. Mechanisms such as patents,
copyrights and trademarks all provide legal protection for these rights. Patent
rights, for example, enable the owner to exclude others from exploiting the
protected invention for a specific period of time in exchange for full disclosure to
the public. Licensing of intellectual property allows a party to use such rights
without obtaining ownership. Payment for these rights is called a licensing or
royalty fee.12
'Message 51, Media-AIDS (Aug. 17, 2000), available at <http://www.hivnet.ch:8000/global/media-aids/
viewR?51>.
4 IAVI World Economic Forum (WEF), 1/2002 [hereinafter IAVI WEF]; cf Jeffery D. Sachs et al., Macro-
economics and Health: InvestinginHealthforEconomicDevelopment, World Health Org. (Dec. 2001), at<http://
www3.who.int/whosis/cmh/cmh_report/e/pdf/021-128.pdf>.
IAVI Need for a vaccine, supra note 1.
6 IAVI WEF, supra note 3, at 1.
' Id at 2.
8 Id.
' IAVI, at <http://www.iavi.org/programs z_science_4-1-2.html> [hereinafter IAVI Programs].
10 Denise Brehm, TLO's Nelsen Helps in Fight forAIDS Vaccine, MIT TECH TALK (May 9, 2001) (on file with
author).
" IAVI WEF, supra note 3, at 3.
12 IAVI Programs, supra note 8.
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The United States has resisted compulsory licensing of intellectual property; accord-
ing to one study, the United States "is pushing hard in several forums to ban or severely
limit compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals patents or related property rights,"'3 and
"consumer groups and others are concerned that international rules for intellectual
property are biased toward the interests of a handful of large firms capable of lobbying
national and international governments."'1
4
The General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investments
(MAI) tend toward price controls but severely limit compulsory licensing. Price controls
are preferred because they are harder to estimate, so tend to result in greater company
profits. However, licensing is not only easier for countries to administer (it can be a
simple net sales percentage), it also promotes a local, competitive generic drug industry,
driving down drug prices and generating additional local economies and technology
transfer. Compulsory licensing also sidesteps many problems, such as failure of price
controls, refusals by companies to import drugs, and multipart products. Finally, com-
pulsory licensing avoids potential price discrimination by companies seeking to charge
higher prices in higher-income countries that employ price controls. These countries
often look at foreign prices to set price caps, so the incentive is for companies to price
their drugs as high as possible in lower-income countries to avoid losing potential prof-
its from the higher-income countries. One example is the AIDS drug Crixivan®,5 which
ended up being priced higher in South Africa than in the United States."
In plain words, without incentives private companies are unlikely to invest in devel-
oping a vaccine that compromises their intellectual property rights. 7 However, there
is precedent for collaboration between the private sector and local communities or gov-
ernments. The anti-HIV compound prostratin (from a hepatitis tree bark remedy) was
developed in Samoa with the cooperation of village chiefs in exchange for a portion of
future profits; 20 percent of the profits from any future drug will now be split between
the Samoan government, this particular village, and the two village healers who helped
develop the drug."8
One possible incentive is voluntary agreements that "allow the company to retain
intellectual property rights in wealthier markets but which reserve limited rights for
marketing of the vaccine in developing countries.""'
Alternative tax regimes and venture capital tax incentives may also encourage private
industry to invest in a vaccine by lowering the financial risks.20 Tiered pricing is also
important, because affordability is essential for global access to a vaccine while still
allowing companies to achieve reasonable returns on their research and production
investments.2' Purchase agreements may also be essential to ensure a market once the
3James Packard Love, A Free Trade Areafor the Americas: A Consumer Perspective on Proposals as they Relate to
Rules RegardingIntellectual Property, Third Trade Ministerial and Americas Business Forum, May 13-16, 1997,
at <http://www.cptech.org/pharm/belopaper.html#trade>.
'4 Id. at 10-11.
Crixivan is a registered trademark of Merck & Co., Inc.
'6 Love, supra note 12, at 8.
17 IAVI, available at <http://www.iavi.org> (internal link: iavi's PROGRAMS/encouraging industrial
participation [hereinafter IAVI, Industrial Participation].
" Landmark Deal Reached Between AIDS Research Group, Samoans on HIVDrug, REUTERS HEALTH (NewYork)
Dec. 13, 2001 (on file with author).
"9 IAVI WEF, supra note 3, at 4.
"'Anatole F. Krattiger, Public-Private Partnerships forEfficient Proprietary Biotech Management and Transfer, and
Increased Private Sector Investments, in IP STRATEGY TODAY 22 (2002) (on file with author).
21 IAVI WEF, supra note 3, at 4.
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vaccine has been developed; this type of agreement secures private investments by
generating governmental planning and infrastructures for drug delivery.22
Finally, IAVI has invested $15 million to create vaccine development partnerships to
ensure that AIDS vaccines reach developing countries.2 ' For example, IAVI invested
$9.1 million in U.K-Kenya and U.S.-South Africa vaccine research teams, with funding
coming from Crusaid, the EltonJohn AIDS Foundation, the United Kingdom's National
AIDS Trust, and the government of the United Kingdom. In the U.S.-South African
collaboration, two scientists atAlphaVax Human Vaccines Inc., a private company based
in Durham, North Carolina, will join with collaborators from the University of Cape-
town in South Africa to "develop a vaccine based on VEE alphavirus replicon par-
ticles."24 What is unique about these two partnerships is that, "[u] ntil now, most AIDS
vaccine candidates have been produced from HIV strains prevalent in North America
and Europe," while this project will use African strains of the virus and hence will be
more directly relevant to Africans.
Vaccine development partnerships enable IAVI "to help make the fruits of weighty
intellectual property rights available to the public sector of developing countries." In
one example, "IAVI has secured rights to ensure that a successful vaccine will be dis-
tributed in developing countries at a reasonable price. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, should the company decline to produce the vaccine for developing countries in
reasonable quantity at reasonable price, IAVI will have certain rights to obtain licenses
in order to contract with other manufacturers to make the vaccine available in those
countries."" Exclusive intellectual property gives control over manufacturing, tiered
pricing, etc.-but developing partnerships require giving up some intellectual property
rights. The partnerships also address other important bioethical issues associated with
human testing, regulatory oversight of pharmaceutical companies, risk-benefit analyses,
and sufficient supply and distribution of vaccines.
To conclude, the AIDS vaccine conundrum will not be solved unilaterally. We cannot
rely on private companies to be either philanthropic or humanitarian organizations-
but we can expect that they will do their part when offered the proper incentives, in the
form of partnerships with philanthropic organizations, governments, and in some cases
even local communities. Only by working together, and by working smart, will we be
able to surmount the obstacles to AIDS vaccine research and development and begin
to make an impact on alleviating the tremendous burden of human suffering engen-
dered by this tenacious disease.
CLOSING REMARKS BY ALLYN L. TAYLOR
The presentations by Professors Abbott, Smith, and Andresen point to the need to
advance global intersectoral action, including innovative mechanisms for cooperation
with the private sector both nationally and internationally, to promote universal access
to interventions based on increased knowledge of the molecular basis of disease
processes.
One important approach, described by Professor Andresen in her review of the Inter-
national AIDS Vaccine Initiative, is the global public-private partnership. Although formal
collaboration with the private sector on health matters was virtually unheard of a decade
22 id.
" IAVI, Industrial Participation, supra note 16.2 4IAVI, Two InnovativeAIDS VaccineDevelop ent Partnerships Launched (Nov. 26,1998), at<http://www.iavi.org/
press/22/events z_pressarchives_ 2.html>.
25 IAVI Programs, supra note 8.
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ago, in the last ten years public international organizations have entered into a remark-
ably diverse array of partnerships with the commercial sector, which vary according to
function, legal status, governance, management, and participants. A large variety of
such partnerships have been formed to strengthen product development and product
donation or distribution, or to strengthen and coordinate health services generally.
There is a clearly a wide diversity of associations encompassed within the generic
expression "public-private partnership." While such ventures hold important promise
in promoting global public health and human rights, there has generally been little
systematic evaluation of how these partnerships function and what constitutes good
practice. Professor Andresen's remarks provide important insight on how such partner-
ships can further the development of vaccines and other pharmacological interventions
in light of the structure of intellectual property rights.
Finally, I would ask everyone to consider what meaningful contribution international
law can make to protecting human rights and public health in this era of genetic ad-
vances. What are the strengths and limitations of international law as a tool to protect
human rights and public health? As a number of scholars have noted, a plethora of
international texts, principally the International Bill of Human Rights, contain core
axioms of international human rights law that apply broadly to the protection of global
public health and human rights in regard to genetic science. However, most of the
rights enumerated at the global level are highly general principles that are not specific
to genetics and technology.
An important effort of the global community to address the human rights implica-
tions of genetic science through conventional international lawmaking has just begun.
In December 2001, the UN General Assembly established an ad hoc working group of
the Sixth Committee to consider an international instrument to ban the reproductive
cloning of human beings. This initiative, which was sponsored by France and Germany,
was motivated by public announcements from certain laboratories of impending at-
tempts to begin reproductive cloning of humans. It is reported that the venue of the Sixth
Committee was sought, in part, because the sponsors of the initiative believed that a
convention narrowly tailored to prohibit human reproductive cloning could be achieved
relatively expeditiously in the Legal Committee.
The Ad Hoc Committee met at the end of February in its first of two scheduled ses-
sions to elaborate a mandate for the proposed treaty. I attended this closed session on
behalf of WHO, but most of what occurred has already been publicly reported. Most
notably, controversy has already swelled at the first session. The majority of delegations
that took the floor supported the original proposal of France and Germany to limit the
convention to the reproductive cloning of human beings. However, a small but vocal
minority of states supported extending the proposed prohibition to cover therapeutic
cloning. One of their principal arguments is that therapeutic cloning and embryonic
stem cell research involve the destruction of human life, since cloned embryos are
destroyed in the process.
The controversy in the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee has the potential to sig-
nificantly slow down and perhaps completely derail the codification effort. Those inter-
ested in the role of international law in regulating genetic science should carefully
watch this current treaty initiative. It raises important questions about the capacity of
the international community to respond to developments in technology and science
rapidly and effectively. It also raises questions about the capacity of international law
to effectively address global issues raised by scientific advances that closely border the
politically explosive question of when life begins.
